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This paper studies a class of dynamic voluntary contribution games in a setting with
discounting and neoclassical payoffs (differentiable, strictly concave in the public good,
and quasilinear in the private good). An achievable pro￿le is the limit point of a subgame
perfect equilibrium path ￿ the ultimate cumulative contribution vector of the players. A
pro￿le is shown to be achievable only if it is in the undercore of the underlying coalitional
game, i.e., the pro￿le cannot be blocked by a coalition using a component-wise smaller
pro￿le. Conversely, if free-riding incentives are strong enough that contributing zero is a
dominant strategy in the stage games, then any undercore pro￿le is the limit of achievable
pro￿les as the period length shrinks. Thus, in this case when the period length is very
short, (i) the set of achievable contributions does not depend on whether the players can
move simultaneously or only in a round-robin fashion; (ii) an ef￿cient pro￿le can be ap-
proximately achieved if and only if it is in the core of the underlying coalitional game; and
(iii) any achievable pro￿le can be achieved almost instantly.
KEYWORDS: dynamic games, monotone games, core, public goods, voluntary contribu-
tion, gradualism
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De￿ne a ￿dynamic voluntary contribution game￿ to be a multistage game in which players
contribute amounts of a private good to a public project in multiple periods. The contributions
are utilized by the project to produce future public bene￿ts. Familiar examples include a fund
drive, or a never-ending sequence of fund drives, to ￿nance university buildings, public radio
programs, or a presidential campaign. Contributions may take the form of effort or produced
inputs, such as the program modules contributed to an open source software project.
Being able to contribute in multiple periods may alleviate the free-rider problem. For exam-
ple, in the settings considered in Marx and Matthews (2000), equilibria with positive contribu-
tions exist if and only if the number of periods in which the players can contribute is suf￿ciently
large. Some of these equilibria achieve ef￿cient outcomes in the limit as the discount factor goes
to one. The logic of the result is simple: a player is induced to contribute in early periods be-
cause doing so induces others to contribute in future periods. The amount a player contributes
in a period must be small so that the others will want to contribute later, which implies that
contributions must be made piecemeal over time. The necessity of such ￿strategic gradualism￿
has been demonstrated in several related papers, most generally in Compte and Jehiel (2004).
Most of the literature on dynamic contribution focuses on technologies with ￿threshold pro-
vision points,￿ which are aggregate contribution levels at which the produced public good dis-
continuously increases. (The typical example is a binary project like the building of a bridge.)
Because of the discontinuity, once the cumulative contribution is suf￿ciently close to the ￿nal
threshold, each player’s best reply is to contribute enough to achieve the threshold. Accord-
ingly, backwards induction arguments can be used to characterize equilibria, and equilibrium
contributions are raised in only a ￿nite number of periods. This roughly describes much of
Admati and Perry (1991), Gale (1995), Marx and Matthews (2000), Compte and Jehiel (2003),
Choi, Gale, and Kariv (2006), Yildirim (2006), and Duffy, Ochs, and Vesterlund (2007).
Thresholds are absent, however, in many settings. This is true of a public project with
a neoclassical production function, i.e., one that is strictly increasing and concave. With an
in￿nite contributing horizon and no threshold, backwards induction cannot be used. Only a few
studies of no-threshold games have appeared. Using a discounting payoff criterion, Marx and
Matthews (2000), Lockwood and Thomas (2002), and Pitchford and Snyder (2004) study rather
special cases of no-threshold games, showing the existence of equilibria in which contributions
are made in￿nitely often, and which are approximately ef￿cient if the discount factor is close to
one. Gale (2001) shows that such games without discounting have fully ef￿cient equilibria.
1This paper provides a more complete study of no-threshold, in￿nite-horizon contribution
games with discounting. The goal is to characterize the nature of all equilibrium contribution
pro￿les and payoffs, with an emphasis on distributional as well as ef￿ciency aspects.
Overview of Results
In each period of the games studied in this paper, some players can contribute private good to
a public project. Every player is able to move in￿nitely often, but not necessarily each period.
Contributions are irreversible, do not depreciate, and are publicly observed. The project uses
the sum of all past contributions to produce a ￿ow of public good. Each player maximizes the
discounted sum of her stage-game payoffs. For simplicity and to facilitate comparisons, each
player’s stage-game payoff function is assumed to be differentiable, quasilinear in the player’s
private good, and strictly concave in the sum of past contributions currently used to provide
public good. The concavity eliminates thresholds.
Attention is restricted to pure strategy subgame perfect equilibria. Any equilibrium gener-
ates a nondecreasing path of cumulative contribution pro￿les. A contribution pro￿le is achiev-
able if it is the limit point of an equilibrium path. A pro￿le is ef￿cient if it is Pareto optimal for
the stage-game payoff functions. Thus, an outcome path is ef￿cient if and only if it achieves
an ef￿cient pro￿le immediately, in the ￿rst period possible. We shall see that discounting pre-
cludes ef￿ciency. The goal is to characterize the set of achievable pro￿les and equilibrium
payoffs, especially for large discount factors.
The characterizations are in terms of an underlying coalitional game. The notion of ￿block-
ing￿ in this game re￿ects two features of the dynamic game. First, since every pro￿le on an
equilibrium path of the dynamic game must lie below the contribution pro￿le the path achieves,
a coalition should only be able to use a smaller pro￿le to block the achieved pro￿le. I thus de￿ne
a pro￿le to be underblocked by a coalition if there exists a smaller pro￿le that each coalition
member prefers, and which prescribes zero contributions for the nonmembers. Second, since
a player in the dynamic game can raise her contribution any amount whenever she is able to
move, blocking is de￿ned using the payoffs the players can obtain by unilaterally raising their
contribution from the blocking pro￿le.
The undercore is the set of pro￿les that are not underblocked. Thus, an undercore pro￿le
does not require any coalition to contribute a disproportionately large amount. The undercore is
typically a strict subset of the individually rational pro￿les, if there are more than two players.
The undercore contains the familiar core, the set of pro￿les that are not blocked by the usual
de￿nition. Indeed, the core is precisely the set of ef￿cient pro￿les in the undercore.
2The ￿rst main result is that all achievable pro￿les are in the undercore. Thus, no coalition
can be induced to contribute too much. If the limit of a sequence of achievable pro￿les is an
ef￿cient pro￿le, it must be in the core. Since the undercore (core) is typically a strict subset of
the individually rational (and ef￿cient) pro￿les, this is an ￿anti-folk-theorem￿ result.1
The second main result is a partial converse of the ￿rst: almost any contribution pro￿le
in the undercore is achievable if the period length is short enough. Moreover, there is a ￿xed
sequence of pro￿les converging to the given undercore pro￿le that is an equilibrium path for all
small period lengths. This result is obtained under two further assumptions. The ￿rst is a weak
cyclicity assumption on the move structure satis￿ed, e.g., by the simultaneous and round-robin
structures. The second additional assumption is that the payoffs satisfy the prisoners’ dilemma
property that in any stage game, not contributing more is a dominant strategy for each player.
This is the case in which free riding incentives are strongest.
When both results obtain, the set of achievable contribution pro￿les converges to the under-
core as the period length goes to zero. An ef￿cient pro￿le can be attained in the limit if and
only if it is in the core. This is true regardless of whether players can contribute simultaneously
each period, or only in a round robin fashion.
The nature of the pro￿le an equilibrium path achieves is, of course, unimportant for payoffs
when the convergence is very slow. However, since an achievable pro￿le can be achieved by
the same equilibrium path for all small period lengths, the real time required to get close to
the achieved pro￿le is negligible when the period length is very small. Thus, in the limit any
achievable pro￿le can be achieved in a ￿twinkling of the eye￿. Although strategic gradualism
is necessary (if the achieved pro￿le is non-autarchic) in the sense that the convergence must be
asymptotic, it does not necessarily generate signi￿cant inef￿ciency if the period length is very
short. An ef￿cient payoff is the limit of equilibrium payoffs if and only if it is a payoff generated
by a pro￿le in the core.
Relationship to the Literature
The dynamic voluntary contribution games of this paper correspond to the ￿monotone games
with positive spillovers￿ of Gale (2001). The main difference is that a payoff in the latter is not
a discounted sum of the stage-game payoffs, but is instead their limit. The stage-game payoff
functions in Gale (2001) are more general than those of this paper, being de￿ned on Euclidian
spaces of arbitrary dimension and assumed only to be continuous, exhibit positive spillovers,
1The folk theorem of Dutta (1995) for stochastic games does not apply here because its ￿asymptotic state inde-
pendence￿ assumptions, (A1) and (A2), are not satis￿ed.
3and satisfy a boundedness property. The main result is that any ￿strongly minimal positive
satiation point￿ is, in this paper’s terminology, achievable. The demonstration in this paper that
almost any undercore pro￿le is achievable if the period length is short enough extends Gale’s
no-discounting result to a class of games with discounting.
As in this paper, Lockwood and Thomas (2002) also consider dynamic contribution games
withdiscountingandnothresholds. Theyrestrictattentiontotwo-playergames, withsymmetric
payofffunctionsthatexhibittheprisoners’dilemmapropertythateachplayer’spayoffdecreases
in her own contribution. When the payoffs are differentiable, the pro￿le achieved by the most
ef￿cient symmetric equilibrium is shown to be inef￿cient, and to achieve an inef￿ciently small
pro￿le. In this paper the analogous result is obtained for any equilibrium. As the discount factor
goes to one, Lockwood and Thomas (2002) show that the most ef￿cient symmetric equilibrium
converges to an ef￿cient equilibrium. Pitchford and Snyder (2004) obtain a similar result. These
asymptotic results foreshadow the suf￿ciency result of this paper, that any undercore (and hence
core) pro￿le is achievable in the limit as the period length shrinks to zero.
Lockwood and Thomas (2002) also study their model with ￿linear kinked payoffs￿ as in
Marx and Matthews (2000). The related result they obtain in this case is that the most ef￿cient
symmetric equilibrium payoff of the simultaneous move game can be attained also in the alter-
nating move game, in the limit as discounting is taken to zero. This result about the irrelevancy
of the move structure foreshadows that of this paper.
Lastly, Bagnoli and Lipman (1989) study the connection between the core of a public goods
coalitional game and the equilibrium outcomes of a dynamic game. The public good is discrete,
which creates a sequence of thresholds. The main result is the design of a dynamic game,
without discounting, that fully implements the core, given an equilibrium re￿nement criterion
combining trembling-hand perfection with successive elimination of dominated strategies. The
designed game differs from the usual voluntary contribution game by having a ￿contribution
collector￿ who proportionately refunds the contribution amounts each period that exceed the
largest threshold point that has been reached, and who stops the game and produces the public
good once the new contributions in some period are too small to reach the next threshold.
Organization
The games to be studied are described in Section 2, and preliminary results in Section 3. Section
4 is devoted to the coalitional game. Sections 5 and 6 contain the main results, necessary and
suf￿cient conditions for a pro￿le to be achievable. Summarizing theorems are in Section 7, and
conclusions in Section 8. Appendices A￿E contain proofs.
42. Dynamic Contribution Games
This section contains descriptions of the games to be considered, scenarios from which they
arise, and lastly the smoothness assumptions.
Game Description
The set of players is N D f1;:::;ng; with n ￿ 2: In each stage game, player i will choose
a (cumulative) contribution, xi 2 RC. Given a contribution pro￿le x 2 Rn
C; the aggregate
contribution is X D
P
i2N xi: The aggregate of all but player i is X￿i D X ￿ xi:
In each period t D 1;2;:::; the players choose a pro￿le xt D .xt
1;:::;xt
n/: A path is a
sequence E x D fxtg1
tD0 of pro￿les that starts with x0 D .0;:::;0/: A path generates for player i
the payoff




where u : Rn
C ! Rn is the stage-game payoff function and ￿ 2 .0;1/ is the discount factor.
The stage-game payoffs take the form
ui.x/ D vi.X/ ￿ xi: (2)
Each valuation function vi satis￿es vi.0/ D 0; and other assumptions made below.
The game is monotone in the sense that xt ￿ xt￿1 for each t ￿ 0 is required.2 The move
structure is a sequence E N D fNtg1
tD1 of nonempty subsets of players. Only players in Nt can
raise their contributions in period t: Thus, xt
i D x
t￿1
i for all i = 2 Nt is also required. A feasible
path is one that satis￿es these two requirements.
Each player is able to move in￿nitely often: [￿￿tN￿ D N for all t ￿ 1: Past contributions
are publicly observed. The extensive form game thus de￿ned is denoted 0.￿; E N/:
Contribution Scenarios
The game 0.￿; E N/ arises from at least two simple contribution scenarios.3 In the ￿rst one,
the players contribute private good over multiple periods, but consume only at the end of the
game. If it ends in period t; the utility of player i is O ui. f .xt/;!i ￿ xt
i/; where f .xt/ is the
public good produced, !i is the player’s private good endowment, and O ui is the player’s utility
function for the two goods. The date at which the game ends is a random variable T satisfying
2Here, x ￿ x0 means xi ￿ x0
i for all iI x > x0 means x 6D x0 and x ￿ x0I and x ￿ x0 means xi > x0
i for all i:
3Games similar to 0.￿; E N/ arise also in other, contribution-like settings, such as those in Pitchford and Snyder
(2004), Ochs and Park (2004), and Zissimos (2007).
5Pr.T D t/ D ￿t￿1.1￿￿/ for any t ￿ 1 : conditional on the game having not ended before date t;
it ends then with probability 1￿￿: This random ￿breakdown￿ is an external friction that serves
both to make the game well-de￿ned and to give teeth to subgame perfection, familiar from the
sequential bargaining literature, and used in the related model of Pitchford and Snyder (2004).
In this ￿rst scenario, a player’s expected utility from a path E x is as shown in (1), with
ui.xt/ D O ui. f .xt/;!i ￿xt
i/: If the produced public good depends only on the aggregate contri-
bution, and the payoffs take the quasilinear form O ui. f .X/;!i ￿ xi/ D O vi. f .X// ￿ xi C !i; the
stage-game payoffs in (2) are obtained, modulo the constant !i:4
The second contribution scenario entails ongoing consumption and discounting. Consider
an unending sequence of fund drives used to acquire capital (e.g.university buildings) that pro-
duces future public goods (education and research). The cost of a contribution is borne when it
is made. Participants can contribute any number of times, and are informed of the total amounts
contributed to date. If the capital the project uses does not depreciate, 0.￿; E N/ is a model of
such a fund drive. To show this, we show how the payoff functions (1) and (2) arise.
Suppose contributions are collected at dates ￿ D 1;21;31; and so on. At date t1; player
i makes the incremental contribution xt
i ￿ x
t￿1
i ￿ 0; raising her cumulative contribution to
xt
i: Contributions become the capital of the project, so that the amount available to produce
public good in the time interval [t1;.t C1/1/ is Xt; the aggregate contribution to date. Player
i values this ￿ow of public good at rate O vi.Xt/; which is normalized so that O vi.0/ D 0: The
player’s discounted (to date t1/ utility increment in the period is the discounted sum of this rate





























As desired, this payoff is the same as (1) and (2), letting vi.X/ D r￿1O vi.X/.
In upcoming sections the valuation function vi is held ￿xed while taking ￿ ! 1: If we
have this second contribution scenario in mind, it is important to interpret the exercise as taking
the period length to zero. It should not be interpreted as taking the interest rate to zero, since
4If in 0.￿; E N/ a contribution xt
i were feasible only if xt
i ￿ !i; the results of this paper would hold when each !i
is large enough that these constraints do not bind in equilibrium.
6vi.X/ D r￿1O vi.X/ diverges as r ! 0: This re￿ects the fact that for very small interest rates,
a marginal contribution today generates a massively large future bene￿t in present value terms,
sincethatbene￿tisreceivedineveryfutureperiod. Inthisscenariothereisnofreeriderproblem
when the discount rate is very small.
Smoothness Assumptions
The valuation functions are assumed to be continuously differentiable, strictly increasing, and
strictly concave in X: These are the neoclassical assumptions of perfect divisibility, monotonic
convex preferences, and decreasing returns in public good production.
Because vi is strictly increasing, the following positive spillover property holds:
(PS) ui.￿/ strictly increases in x j; for all i 6D j 2 N:











The ￿rst inequality ensures that
P
i2N vi.X/ ￿ X; the sum of the players’ payoffs, has a maxi-
mizer. This ef￿cient aggregate contribution is unique, and denoted as YN. The second inequality
in (3) implies YN > 0:
The above assumptions are maintained throughout the paper. In contrast, at times it will be
useful to assume that v0
i.0/ ￿ 1 for all i 2 N. This assumption is equivalent, given the strict
concavity of each vi; to the following prisoners’ dilemma property:
(PD) ui.￿/ strictly decreases in xi; for all i 2 N:
When (PD) holds, each player’s dominant strategy in any stage game, regardless of the history,
is to not raise her contribution. Free-riding incentives are the strongest in this case. Much of
the related literature, e.g., Lockwood and Thomas (2002) and Pitchford and Snyder (2004), is
exclusively concerned with payoffs that satisfy (PD).
3. Equilibrium Paths and Achievable Pro￿les
We restrict attention to pure strategy subgame perfect equilibria, henceforth referred to simply
as ￿equilibria￿. Each one gives rise to an equilibrium path. The limit of an equilibrium path
is an achievable pro￿le. This section contains initial observations about these objects. Missing
proofs are in Appendix A.
7Preliminaries
The standalone contribution of player i is the unique maximizer of vi.xi/ ￿ xi; denoted as Yi:
It is given by Yi D 0 if v0
i.0/ ￿ 1; and otherwise by v0
i.Yi/ D 1: Let N Y :D maxi2N Yi denote the
largest standalone contribution. Note that N Y < YN; and N Y D 0 if and only if (PD) holds.
Refer to a pro￿le of the form .Yi;0￿i/ as a solo pro￿le if Yi D N Y: Only a player with the
largest standalone amount contributes in a solo pro￿le, and she contributes that amount. As is
easily shown, the set of equilibria of the one-shot simultaneous contribution game is equal to
the convex hull of the set of solo pro￿les. Since N Y < YN; any solo pro￿le is inef￿cient.
Starting from a pro￿le x; the maximal payoff player i could obtain by raising her contri-
bution, when the others do not raise theirs, is u￿
i .x/ :D maxx0
i￿xi ui.x0
i;x￿i/. Denoting this
maximizing contribution as bi.x/; it is given by
bi.x/ D xi C max.0;Yi ￿ X/: (4)
Note that u￿ is continuous, and that it satis￿es the following positive spillover and weak prison-
ers’ dilemma properties:
(PS*) u￿
i .￿/ strictly increases in x j; for all i 6D j 2 NI
(PD*) u￿
i .￿/ weakly decreases in xi; for all i 2 N:
Any pro￿le x for which u.x/ ￿ u￿.0/ is individually rational. It is strictly individually
rational if u.x/ ￿ u￿.0/:
Any pro￿le x for which u￿.x/ D u.x/ is a satiation pro￿le (Gale, 2001). A satiation pro￿le
here is one for which X ￿ N Y:
Equilibrium Paths
As usual, a central construct for subgame perfection is the continuation payoff that player i
receives in period t from a path E x :
Ut




Note that this is a convex combination of the player’s present and future stage-game payoffs.
We now derive two conditions that equilibrium continuation payoffs and paths must satisfy.
The conditions are based on the observation that after any history, a player can always choose
to never raise her contribution again. Refer to this as her passive strategy. Because of (PS),
8the worst conceivable punishment the other players can impose upon a deviator is to play their
passive strategies thereafter.
Suppose player i deviates from an equilibrium path E x to her passive strategy in period t: If
the others maximally punish her by subsequently playing their passive strategies, the deviation
yields a degenerate path E z in which zs D .x
t￿1
i ;xt
￿i/ for all periods s ￿ t: It gives the deviator
a continuation payoff of Ut
i .E z;￿/ D ui.x
t￿1
i ;xt
￿i/: Her actual continuation payoff from the
deviation cannot be less, and it cannot be more than her equilibrium continuation payoff. The





i .E x;￿/ for all t ￿ 1; i 2 N: (5)
The second condition is obtained only for a player i 2 Nt; i.e., a player who is able to















i .E x;￿/ for all t ￿ 1; i 2 Nt: (6)
Condition (6) is also a suf￿cient condition for a feasible E x to be a Nash equilibrium path.
De￿ne the passive trigger strategy pro￿le for E x as follows: in period t; play xt if .x1;:::;xt￿1/
was played in the past, but otherwise play the same pro￿le as was played in the previous period.
The outcome of this strategy pro￿le is E x; and it is clearly a Nash equilibrium if E x satis￿es (6).
A passive trigger Nash equilibrium need not be subgame perfect, since the passive strategy
pro￿le is not an equilibrium of any subgame that starts from a pro￿le with an aggregate less
than N Y: In such a subgame, some player’s best reply to the passive strategies is to raise the
aggregate to her Yi as soon as possible. However, no subgame of this type exists if (PD) holds,
as then N Y D 0; and a passive trigger equilibrium is subgame perfect. Therefore, (6) is suf￿cient
for a feasible path to be an equilibrium path when (PD) holds. Since (5) then implies (6), its
necessity allows us to conclude that (5) is both necessary and suf￿cient in this case. This proves
the following lemma.
Lemma 1. Any equilibrium path satisﬁes (5) and (6). If (PD) holds, then any feasible path is
an equilibrium path if and only if satisﬁes (5).
Remark 1. If (PD) is weakened to the assumption that Yi D N Y for all i 2 N; then (6) is still
sufﬁcient for a feasible path to be an equilibrium path. The proof of this uses strategies that
require a unilateral deviator, whose deviation yields an aggregate O X < N Y; to alone raise O X to N Y:
9Unfortunately, if N Y > 0, the assumption that each Yi D N Y is not robust to perturbations of the
valuation functions. This generalization is, therefore, not pursued here.
The next lemma establishes that every equilibrium path converges, and that its limit is a
satiation pro￿le. The convergence is asymptotic if the aggregate is strictly larger than N Y:
Lemma 2. Every equilibrium path converges to a satiation proﬁle. The convergence does not
occur in ﬁnite time if the limiting proﬁle satisﬁes X > N Y:
A pro￿le x is achievable in 0.￿; E N/ if it is the limit of one of its equilibrium paths. The
main results of the paper concern the set of achievable pro￿les.
Achievable Pro￿les
Solo pro￿les are often achievable. For example, suppose a player i with Yi D N Y is able to move
every period. Then the strategy pro￿le in which she chooses xt
i D min.0;Yi ￿ Xt￿1/ at every
node, and the others play their passive strategies, is an equilibrium. It achieves the solo pro￿le
.Yi;0￿i/ in the ￿rst period.
A routine argument shows that the payoff generated by an achieved pro￿le x is the limit
of the continuation payoffs along any path E x that achieves it: Ut.E x;￿/ ! u.x/ as t ! 1:
This convergence may be non-monotonic, since a player’s stage-game payoff may decrease
when she raises her contribution. However, the next lemma implies that any payoff setback is
temporary. The payoff generated by the achieved pro￿le exceeds each stage-game payoff and
each continuation payoff.
Lemma 3. Suppose x is achieved by an equilibrium path E x: Then u￿.xs/ ￿ u.x/ for each
s ￿ 0; and hence Ut.E x;￿/ ￿ u.x/ for each t ￿ 0:
Any achievable pro￿le is individually rational, as is veri￿ed by setting t D 0 in Lemma 3 to
obtain u￿.0/ ￿ u.x/: The following lemma establishes a stronger result.
Lemma 4. Any non-solo achievable proﬁle is strictly individually rational.
4. The Coalitional Game
This section concerns the underlying coalitional game that will be used to characterize achiev-
able pro￿les. Missing proofs are in Appendix B.
10Blocking, Underblocking, and the Undercore
The coalitional game re￿ects two features of the dynamic game. First, recall that when a player





￿i/: When considering whether to block a pro￿le by implementing on its own an
alternative pro￿le, a coalition should therefore evaluate the alternative using u￿: Hence, letting
a coalition be a nonempty subset of players, de￿ne a pro￿le x to be blocked by a coalition S
using a pro￿le z if and only if z￿S D 0 and u￿
S.z/ > uS.x/: The set of unblocked pro￿les is the
core, denoted as C:
The second relevant feature of the dynamic game is that a player can only deviate from a
pro￿le on the equilibrium path, and this path lies below the pro￿le it achieves. We are thus
interested in whether an achieved pro￿le can be blocked from a pro￿le that lies below it. Ac-
cordingly, de￿ne a pro￿le x to be underblocked by a coalition S if it blocks x using a pro￿le
z ￿ x: The set of pro￿les that are not underblocked is the undercore, denoted as D:
An underblocked pro￿le is blocked. The core is thus a subset of the undercore: C ￿ D:
Since every core pro￿le is Pareto ef￿cient (with respect to u/; we see that the undercore contains
some ef￿cient pro￿les. The following lemma shows that the undercore also contains the solo
pro￿les, and that it itself is contained in the set of individually rational satiation pro￿les.
Lemma 5. .i/ Any solo proﬁle is in the undercore. .ii/ Any undercore proﬁle is an individually
rational satiation proﬁle.





denotes the sum of the coalition members’ payoffs if they contribute X and non-members con-
tribute zero. Our assumptions imply fS has a unique maximizer, to be denoted as YS: (Let
Y? :D 1:/ The value of S is V.S/ :D fS.YS/: For any pro￿le x; let XS :D
P
i2S xi:
Proposition 1. The undercore is the set of satiation proﬁles satisfying, for all coalitions S;
X < YS or
P
i2S
vi.X/ ￿ XS ￿ V.S/: (7)









11If a pro￿le x satis￿es the second inequality in (7), it gives the coalition S a total payoff that
is not less than the maximal payoff it could obtain on its own. In this case S cannot block x, and
hence cannot underblock it either. When x satis￿es the ￿rst inequality in (7), it requires S to
contribute an amount smaller than YS: In this case, if S can block x; it can do so only by using
a larger contribution, zS > xS; and so it again cannot underblock x:
From (8) we see that the undercore is the set of satiation pro￿les satisfying a number of
inequalities, each of which bounds a coalition’s contribution. This is a ￿balance￿ requirement.
Like a core pro￿le, an undercore pro￿le must not ask any coalition to contribute more than a
certain amount that, in this case, is a nondecreasing function of X:
The inequalities determining the undercore are less restrictive for pro￿les with smaller ag-
gregates. For example, from (7) we see that if x is a satiation pro￿le satisfying X < YS for
every non-singleton coalition, then x 2 D if and only if it is individually rational. However, if
X D YN; then x 2 D if and only if
P
i2S vi.X/ ￿ XS ￿ V.S/ for all coalitions. The set of
such undercore pro￿les is the core, as part .ii/ of the following corollary shows. It refers to the
coalition that a pro￿le x requires to contribute, N.x/ :D fi 2 N : xi > 0g:
Corollary 1. .i/ If x 2 D; then X ￿ YN.x/: .ii/ C D fx 2 D : X D YNg:
Example 1. Let n D 3 and each vi.X/ D 2
p
X: The optimal contribution and value of each
coalition are then Yi D V.fig/ D 1; Yfi;jg D V.fi; jg/ D 4; and YN D V.N/ D 9: Satiation














C : 4 < X ￿ 9; xi ￿ 2
p





Note that D is a strict subset of the set of individually rational satiation proﬁles. The core is the
subset of D for which X D 9; and can be written as C D
￿
x 2 R3




In the next section, only undercore pro￿les will be shown to be achievable. This is a restrictive
result for payoffs only if the set of undercore payoffs, u.D/; is not equal to the entire set of
individually rational feasible payoffs,
R :D
￿
O u 2 u.R3
C/ : O u ￿ u￿.0/
￿
:
We have u.D/ ￿ R: The following corollary shows that this inclusion is strict so long as a
non-singleton, non-grand coalition has a positive value, as is typically true if n > 2.
12Corollary 2. If a coalition S exists such that 1 < jSj < n and V.S/ > 0; then Rnu.D/ contains
a nonempty open set of payoffs.
Denote the set of payoffs that are ef￿cient and individually rational as
P :D
￿
O u 2 R : O u ￿ u0 for any u0 2 R
￿
:
Under the hypothesis of Corollary 2 , a similar (omitted) proof shows that Pnu.C/ contains a
nonempty, relativelyopenset. Thus, inthiscasenotallpayoffsthatareef￿cientandindividually
rational are core payoffs. This is true for the example above.
Example 1 (con’t). These sets of payoffs in Example 1 are
R D
￿














O u 2 R3 : O u1 C O u2 C O u3 D 9; 1 ￿ O ui ￿ 5
￿
:
Note that u.D/ is a strict subset of R; and u.C/ is a strict subset of
O P D
￿
O u 2 R3 : O u1 C O u2 C O u3 D 9; 1 ￿ O ui ￿ 6
￿
;
the subset of P generated by the pro￿les x ￿ 0 that are ef￿cient and individually rational.5
Lastly, we note for future reference that because the core is equal to the set of ef￿cient
subset of the undercore, u.C/ ￿ P \ u.D/: As the reverse is also true,6 we have
u.C/ D P \ u.D/: (9)
Weak Underblocking
A related notion of underblocking will allow somewhat sharper results. A coalition S will
be said to weakly underblock a pro￿le x if a pro￿le z < x exists such that z￿S D 0 and
u￿
S.z/ ￿ uS.x/: This de￿nition differs from that of underblocking in two ways: z cannot equal
x; and the coalition members can be indifferent in the sense that u￿
i .z/ D ui.x/:
The following lemma records two simple facts. Any pro￿le that is not weakly underblocked
is strictly individually rational if it is nonzero, and it is in the undercore if it is a satiation pro￿le.
5The larger set P contains payoffs like u.5;5;0/ ￿ .1:325;1:325;6:325/; since x D .5;5;0/ is ef￿cient and
individually rational.
6Proof: Let O u 2 P \ u.D/ be the payoff associated with x 2 D: Then X ￿ YN; by Corollary 1 .i/: This and the
ef￿ciency of x implies X D YN: Corollary 1 .ii/ now implies x 2 C; and so O u 2 u.C/:
13Lemma 6. Suppose x is not weakly underblocked. Then .i/ u.x/ ￿ u￿.0/ if x > 0; and .ii/
x 2 D if x is a satiation proﬁle.
The following lemma shows that for any Y 2 [ N Y;YN]; a pro￿le exists that is not weakly
underblocked and satis￿es X D Y: Since this pro￿le is a satiation pro￿le, it is in the undercore.
It is in the core when Y D YN; in which case it is the Lindahl contribution pro￿le.






is not weakly un-
derblocked, and hence in D:
5. Necessary Conditions for Achievability
This section contains two results: any achievable pro￿le is in the undercore, and it is inef￿cient.
Required proofs are in Appendix C.
It is perhaps surprising that an achievable pro￿le must be in the undercore. Indeed, if a
coalition S underblocks x using z; and a path E x converging to x is being played, at some point
each coalition member would be better off if they all deviated to zS: But how can they manage
to coordinate thier actions in this way? The answer lies in the dynamics, and the fact that z is
below x: In some period ￿ the path E x will move into the region above z: Some coalition member
i must be pivotal for this movement, so that x
￿￿1
i ￿ zi < x￿
i and x￿
￿i > z￿
￿i (this requires some
proof). Accordingly, under the (counterfactual) supposition that E x is an equilibrium path, the
coalition members j 6D i are induced in equilibrium to raise their contributions to at least z j,






i .z/: This and u￿
i .z/ ￿ ui.x/ show that player i can gain by
deviating in period ￿: The pro￿le x is therefore not achievable.
The precise statement of this result is the following proposition. The proof of part .i/ is a
sharpening of the argument just outlined. Part .ii/ is the simple statement that any achievable
pro￿le is in the undercore, and it follows from part .i/. If an achievable pro￿le is solo, it is in
the undercore for that reason. If it is not solo, then it is a strictly individually rational satiation
pro￿le by Lemmas 2 and 4, and so part .i/ and Lemma 6 imply it is in the undercore.
Proposition 2. .i/ Any strictly individually rational achievable proﬁle is not weakly under-
blocked, and is hence in the undercore. .ii/ Every achievable proﬁle is in the undercore.
Remark 2. The proof of part .i/ of Proposition 2 uses only that achievable proﬁles satisfy
(6) (from Lemma 1), that achievable proﬁles are satiation proﬁles (from Lemma 2), and that
14undercoreproﬁlesaresatiationproﬁles(fromLemma6). Theonlypayoffassumptiontheproofs
of these parts of these lemmas use is (PS), positive spillovers. Part .i/ of Proposition 2 is thus
true for fairly general payoffs: for any u : Rn
C ! Rn satisfying (PS) and for which u￿ is well
deﬁned, the undercore contains all achievable proﬁles that are strictly individually rational.
Proposition 2 leaves open the possibility that an ef￿cient pro￿le can be achieved. This
possibility is eliminated by the following proposition.
Proposition 3. Any achievable x is inefﬁcient. In particular, it is either a solo proﬁle, or it is
inefﬁcient for the contributing coalition: X < YN.x/:
A heuristic argument conveys the logic of the proof of Proposition 3. Consider an equilib-
rium path E x that achieves x; with X > N Y: To the ￿rst order, the date t increase in the equilibrium
aggregate, Ct :D Xt ￿ Xt￿1; increases the present value of the surplus of the contributing play-























i /: Let MC be the sum over N.x/ of these
costs. Hence, MB ￿ MC: Now, MC would be minimal if the entire Ct were contributed by























Since X > N Y; the right and hence the left side of this inequality is positive: the marginal social
bene￿t of increasing the aggregate remains positive in the limit. Hence, X < YN.x/:
Remark 3. Achievable proﬁles may be efﬁcient if payoffs are not differentiable. Suppose each
marginal valuation v0
i is positive until it drops to zero at an efﬁcient aggregate amount X￿ that
“completes the project” Then, if ￿ is large, equilibrium paths may exist for which Xt ! X￿:
See Marx and Matthews (2000) and Lockwood and Thomas (2002).
156. Suf￿cient Conditions for Achievability
In this section a near converse to Proposition 2 is established: virtually any undercore pro￿le
can be achieved if the period length is suf￿ciently small. Missing proofs are in Appendix D.
The result is obtained under two further assumptions, made to deal with two dif￿culties
caused by discounting. The ￿rst one, already discussed, is that a discounting player may want
to deviate in a period by contributing too much, e.g., to raise her contribution to Yi immediately
ratherthantowaitforotherstodosointhefuture. InthiscaseapassivetriggerNashequilibrium
may fail to be subgame perfect. This problem is now avoided by assuming (PD). It allows us, by
Lemma1, tofocusonequilibriumpathsratherthanstrategies: afeasiblepath E x isanequilibrium
path if and only if it satis￿es (5).
The second dif￿culty caused by discounting is that a future reward can in￿uence current
behavior only if it is not received too far in the future. As this must be true at any date, the
interval between the times at which the players can move should not grow too quickly as the
game progresses. The following cyclicity property ensures this:
(CY) integer m > 0 exists such that i 2 N.nkCi/m for all i 2 N and k ￿ 0:
Accordingly, player 1 is able to move at date m; player 2 at date 2m; and so on until the pattern
repeats with player 1 able to move at date .n C 1/m: There are no restrictions on who else can
move at dates that are multiples of m; nor on who can move at any other date. Familiar move
structures satisfy (CY). With m D 1; it is satis￿ed by both the simultaneous move structure and
the round-robin structure de￿ned by N R
t :D ft modn C 1g:
The following lemma establishes that for any E N satisfying (CY), any equilibrium path of the
round-robin game passes through the same pro￿les as does an equilibrium path of a game that
has the move structure E N and a certain weakly greater discount factor. This result will allow us
to restrict attention to the round-robin structure.
Lemma 8. Suppose (PD) holds, E N satisﬁes (CY), and E x is feasible for E N R: Then a path E z exists
that passes through the same proﬁles as does E x; and has the property that for any ￿ 2 .0;1/; it
is an equilibrium path of 0.￿1=m; E N/ if E x is an equilibrium path of 0.￿; E N R/:
The path E z in Lemma 8 is obtained by slowing down the the round-robin path E x: player 1
moves in period m instead of period 1; player 2 moves in period 2m instead of period 2; and so
on. Property (CY) insures that this new path is feasible for E N: Along this new path the future
reward a player receives for raising her contribution in the current period is postponed, but it is
16received for enough periods that raising the discount factor to ￿1=m increases its present value
enough to restore incentives.
Given (PD), the necessary conditions obtained in Propositions 2 and 3 reduce to the follow-
ing: an achievable pro￿le must be inef￿cient for the contributing coalition, and it must not be
weakly underblocked. If E N satis￿es (CY), the following proposition shows that these conditions
are suf￿cient as well as necessary, for large discount factors.
Proposition 4. Suppose (PD) holds and E N satisﬁes (CY). Let x be a proﬁle that is not weakly
underblocked and satisﬁes X < YN.x/: Then a path E x and a discount factor ￿ < 1 exist such that
E x is an equilibrium path that achieves x for all ￿ > ￿:
The following is an overview of the proof of Proposition 4. In light of Lemma 8, it only
needs to be proved for the round-robin structure.
Given x; the proof begins be ￿nding two pro￿les, N x and O x; that satisfy N x < O x < x and
u.N x/ ￿ u.O x/ ￿ u.x/: These pro￿les exist because X < YN.x/. The pro￿le O x is chosen close
enough to x that it too is not weakly underblocked. The proof then has three steps.
In Step 1, an in￿nite round-robin path starting at N x and converging to x is constructed.
This path is a round-robin geometric sequence: each player raises her contribution the same
proportional amount towards x when it is her turn to move. The increases are made small
enough that u.x/￿u.xt/ is bounded above zero. This bound shrinks to zero over time, quickly
enough that for all high discount factors, player i’s equilibrium continuation payoff is close
enough to ui.x/ that she is induced to raise her contribution in the current period. This step uses
X < YN.x/ and the concavity of each vi:
Step 2 uses the fact that O x is not weakly underblocked. Adapting an argument in Gale
(2001), a ￿nite, decreasing sequence from N x to the origin is constructed, along which the play-
ers’ payoffs never exceed u.O x/: The construction starts with player 1 lowering her contribution
from N x1 as much as possible without allowing her payoff to exceed u1.O x/: This yields the ￿rst
pro￿le of the sequence. The second is obtained by having player 2 lower her contribution in
the same manner. Continuing in round-robin fashion yields a decreasing sequence of pro￿les
that generate payoffs no greater than u.O x/: The sequence converges, say to a pro￿le z: The fact
that O x is not weakly underblocked implies z D 0 : otherwise, N.z/ would weakly underblock O x
using z: Since u.0/ ￿ u.O x/ by Lemma 6, the convergence occurs in a ￿nite number of steps:
once the sequence is close enough to the origin, a player cannot lower her contribution enough
to raise her payoff to ui.O x/:
Step 3 puts together the sequences obtained in Steps 1 and 2 to yield a path E x that converges
17to x and is feasible for E N R: At a date for which xt ￿ N x; the construction of Step 1 insures that
the remainder of the path is an equilibrium path of the continuation game if ￿ is large. At a date
for which xt < N x; u.xt/ is bounded strictly below u.x/; and so again their continuation payoff
from E x can be made large enough, by choosing ￿ large, that the players are induced to play xtC1:
The path E x is thus an equilibrium path if ￿ is large enough.
7. Synthesis and Discussion
In this section results are put together and implications drawn. Proofs are in Appendix E.
Achievable Pro￿les
Denote the set of achievable pro￿les given a move structure E N as
A. E N/ :D
n
x 2 Rn
C : x is achievable in 0.￿; E N/ for some ￿ < 1
o
:









C : N Y ￿ X < YN.x/; x is not weakly underblocked
￿
:
In words, D0 consists of the solo pro￿les together with the satiation pro￿les that are not weakly
underblocked, and which have an aggregate that is inef￿ciently small for the contributing coali-
tion. When payoffs satisfy (PD), D0 is simply the set of pro￿les that are not weakly under-
blocked and satisfy X < YN.x/. Propositions 2 and 3 imply A. E N/ ￿ D0: Proposition 4 therefore
implies A. E N/ D D0 when (PD) and (CY) hold.
The set D0 is shown in Appendix E to be the same as the undercore up to closure: c‘D0 D
D. This yields the ￿nal part of the following summary theorem.
Theorem 1. Under the maintained assumptions,
(a) A. E N/ ￿ D0 ￿ D; and
(b) A. E N/ D D0 and c‘A. E N/ D D if (PD) and (CY) hold.
Most of Theorem 1 has been discussed already. Part (a) states that any achievable pro￿le is
in the undercore. Therefore, any ef￿cient pro￿le that can be approximately achieved is in the
core. Part (b) gives a full characterization of the set of achievable pro￿les when (PD) and (CY)
hold, and adds that its closure is then precisely the undercore.
A consequence of (b) is a move structure irrelevancy: when payoffs satis￿es (PD), all move
structures that satisfy (CY) give rise to the same achievable pro￿les. In particular, no more
18pro￿les are achievable under the simultaneous structure than under the round-robin structure.
Note, however, that this is a limiting result obtained as ￿ ! 1I for a ￿xed ￿ the set of achievable
pro￿les generally does depend on the move structure.
The main result not included in Theorem 1 is that any achievable pro￿le x can be achieved,
given (PD) and (CY), by the same equilibrium path for all large ￿ (Proposition 4). Thus, if we
interpret a decrease in ￿ as a decrease in the period length 1, the amount of real time required
for the path to enter any ￿xed neighborhood of x goes to zero as 1 ! 0: Every undercore
pro￿le can therefore be approximately achieved instantaneously in the limit. Although strategic
gradualism is necessary in so far as pro￿les with X > N Y are achieved only asymptotically
(Lemma 2), there is no upper bound on the speed of convergence as the period length shrinks.
Equilibrium Payoffs
The set of limits of equilibrium payoffs for a given move structure is
W. E N/ :D c‘
n
U.E x;￿/ : 0 < ￿ < 1; E x an equilibrium path of 0.￿; E N/
o
:
Since every payoff in this set is individually rational, the set of ef￿cient payoffs that are limits of
equilibrium payoffs is P \ W. E N/. The relationship of this set to u.C/; the set of core payoffs,
is established in the following theorem.
Theorem 2. Under the maintained assumptions,
.i/ P \ W. E N/ ￿ u.C/; and
.ii/ P \ W. E N/ D u.C/ if (PD) and (CY) hold.
Part .i/ of Theorem 2 establishes that any ef￿cient payoff that is approximated by equilib-
rium payoffs is a core payoff. Its proof is based on the observation that any achievable pro￿le is
in the undercore (Proposition 2), and every equilibrium payoff is bounded above by the payoff
of the achieved pro￿le (Lemma 3).
Part .ii/ establishes the converse for when (PD) and (CY) hold: every core payoff is then
the limit of a sequence of equilibrium payoffs. Its proof uses the following stronger result.
Lemma 9. u.D/ ￿ W. E N/ if (PD) and (CY) hold.
The proof of Lemma 9 uses the result of Proposition 4 that for almost any x 2 D (i.e., any
x 2 D0/; a path E x exists that converges to it and is an equilibrium path for all large ￿: The path
spends more and more time near x as the period length shrinks, and so the equilibrium payoff
U.E x;￿/ converges to u.x/ as ￿ ! 1: Therefore, u.x/ 2 W. E N/:
19The irrelevancy of the move structure for limits of payoffs is implied by Lemma 9 and,
especially, Theorem 2 .ii/: Given (PD), the set of limiting equilibrium payoffs generated by any
structure satisfying (CY) contains u.D/; and the set of ef￿cient limiting equilibrium payoffs is
precisely u.C/: Neither of these sets depends on the move structure.
8. Conclusion
This paper has characterized the set of achievable contribution pro￿les and equilibrium payoffs
of a certain class of dynamic voluntary contribution games with smooth, discounted payoffs.
The ￿rst main result is that any achievable pro￿le must be in the undercore of the underlying
coalitional game ￿ no coalition can be induced to contribute too much. Unlike the folk theorem
for repeated games, this result yields a restriction on the nature of equilibria that may be testable
in the ￿eld or laboratory. It is also a fairly general result, essentially holding for any payoff
function satisfying the positive spillovers property (see Remark 2).
The converse is true in a limiting sense if payoffs satisfy the prisoners’ dilemma property
(PD), and the move structure satis￿es the cyclicity property (CY). Virtually any undercore pro-
￿le is then achievable if the discount factor is large enough. All core pro￿les and payoffs are
obtained in the limit, but not any other ef￿cient pro￿le or payoff. The limiting set of achievable
pro￿les, and the set of ef￿cient limits of equilibrium payoffs, are the same for all move struc-
tures satisfying (CY), including the simultaneous and round-robin ones. Lastly, any achievable
pro￿le can be achieved instantly in the limit as the period length shrinks to zero, implying an
anti-gradualism result for payoffs.
The payoff assumptions used to obtain the second set of results are strong, even though
commonly used. The role of (PD) is particularly interesting. It identi￿es the economically
most problematic case, that in which the incentives to free ride are strongest. One might have
thought that this would have caused fewer pro￿les to be achievable. However, by insuring the
existence of continuation equilibria that maximally punish deviators (the passive equilibria),
(PD) acutally ensures that the set of achievable pro￿les is as large as possible. The nature
of maximally punishing continuation equilibria in the absence of (PD) is an interesting open
question.
The strict concavity of the valuation functions is another assumption it would be interesting
to weaken. It is used heavily in the proof that virtually any undercore pro￿le is achievable. This
result can fail to hold when threshold provision points exist,7 and concavity indeed insures that
7For example, the binary threshold dynamic contribution game of Compte and Jehiel (2003) has a unique achiev-
20thresholds do not exist. However, a plausible conjecture is that the result should remain true
under other assumptions that also rule out thresholds, ones for example that allow for initial
increasing returns to public good production.
able pro￿le. But it has a continuum of undercore pro￿les: any individually rational pro￿le that completes the project
is in the core and hence undercore.
21Appendix A. Proofs Missing from Section 3
Lemma A1. For any i 2 N; t ￿ 0; and equilibrium path E x : an increasing divergent sequence
fskg1
kD1 of dates exists such that s1 D t; ui.xsk/ ￿ ui.xskC1/; and u￿
i .xsk/ ￿ u￿
i .xskC1/:
Proof. Set s1 D t: Let ￿ > t be the ￿rst date larger than t such that i 2 N￿: Then
ui.xs1/ ￿ u￿






using Lemma 1 to obtain the third inequality. Since U￿
i .E x;￿/ is a convex combination of the
set fui.xs/gs>￿; it is weakly exceeded by at least one of its elements. Hence, s2 ￿ ￿ exists such
that ui.xs1/ ￿ ui.xs2/ and u￿
i .xs1/ ￿ ui.xs2/: The latter implies u￿
i .xs1/ ￿ u￿
i .xs2/: The desired
sequence is obtained by iterating this construction. ￿
Proof of Lemma 2. Let E x be an equilibrium path. Assume it does not converge. Then, as it is




i2N vi.X/ ￿ X is strictly concave in X and has a
￿nite maximizer, it diverges to ￿1 as X ! 1: Hence, ui.xt/ ! ￿1 for some i 2 N: This
implies fui.xt/gt￿0 does not have a nondecreasing subsequence, contrary to Lemma A1. Hence,
E x converges. Let x be its limit.









Take the limit of both sides of this inequality along the unbounded sequence of dates t satisfying
i 2 Nt: Since u￿ and u are continuous and xt ! x; its left side converges to u￿
i .x/ and its right
side to u.x/: Hence, u￿.x/ ￿ u.x/; and so x is a satiation pro￿le.
Now suppose X > N Y: Assume E x converges to x at date T < 1 : xT￿1 < x; and xs D x for
s ￿ T: Let i be a player for whom x
T￿1
i < xi (and so i 2 NT/: Since X > Yi; @ui.x/=@xi D
v0
i.X/ ￿ 1 < 0: This implies the existence of zi 2 [x
T￿1
i ;xi/ such that ui.zi;x￿i/ > ui.x/:
If player i deviates to zi at date T and plays passively thereafter, her continuation payoff
would be at least ui.zi;x￿i/: This deviation payoff exceeds her equilibrium continuation payoff
UT
i .E x;￿/ D ui.x/; contrary to subgame perfection. Thus, E x converges only asymptotically. ￿
Proof of Lemma 3. Let t ￿ 0 and i 2 N: Let fskg1
kD1 be the sequence from Lemma A1. Then
u￿
i .xt/ ￿ u￿
i .xsk/ for all k ￿ 1: Take k ! 1 to obtain u￿
i .xt/ ￿ u￿
i .x/: Thus, u￿
i .xt/ ￿ ui.x/;
since x is a satiation pro￿le by Lemma 2. So we now have ui.xs/ ￿ u￿
i .xs/ ￿ ui.x/ for all
s ￿ 0: From this, Ut.E x;￿/ ￿ u.x/ for any t ￿ 0 is immediate. ￿
Proof of Lemma 4. Let x be an achievable pro￿le, and suppose ui.x/ D u￿
i .0/ for some i 2 N:
We prove the lemma by showing x is solo.
22Let E x be an equilibrium path that achieves x: Let ￿ be the ￿rst date such that i 2 N￿: Then
u￿
i .0/ ￿ u￿
i .0;x￿
￿i/ ￿ U￿
i .E x;￿/ ￿ u￿
i .0/;
where the ￿rst inequality is due to (PS￿/; the second to Lemma 1, and the third to Lemma 3
and ui.x/ D u￿
i .0/: Each displayed inequality is thus an equality. From u￿




￿i D 0: Recall that U￿
i .E x;￿/ is a convex combination of the terms ui.xs/; each of which
has positive weight and, by Lemma 3, is no more than ui.x/ D u￿
i .0/: Hence, U￿
i .E x;￿/ D u￿
i .0/
implies ui.xs/ D u￿
i .0/ for each s ￿ ￿:For s D ￿ this is ui.x￿
i ;0￿i/ D u￿
i .0/; which implies
x￿
i D Yi since Yi uniquely maximizes ui.￿;0￿i/: Thus, x￿ D .Yi;0￿i/:
Assume x￿i > 0: Then T > ￿ exists such that 0￿i D x
T￿1
￿i < xT




￿i/ > ui.xT￿1/ D u￿
i .0/: But by Lemma 1, since ui.xs/ D u￿




i / ￿ UT
i .E x;￿/ D u￿
i .0/: This contradiction proves x￿i D 0: This and ui.x/ D u￿
i .0/
imply x D .Yi;0￿i/: Since X ￿ N Y by Lemma 2, Yi D N Y: This proves x is solo. ￿
Appendix B. Proofs Missing from Section 4
Recall that a coalition S underblocks x using z if u￿
S.z/ > uS.x/; z ￿ x; and z￿S D 0: The
coalition weakly underblocks x using z if u￿
S.z/ ￿ uS.x/; z < x; and z￿S D 0:
Proof of Lemma 5. .i/ Let x D .Yi;0￿i/ be a solo pro￿le, and let z be any pro￿le satisfying
z ￿ x: Then z￿i D 0￿i and u￿
i .z/ D ui.x/: For j 6D i; (PS￿/ implies u￿
j.z/ ￿ u￿
j.x/: Since x is
a satiation pro￿le, u￿
j.x/ D u j.x/: Hence, u￿.z/ ￿ u.x/: This proves x is not underblocked.
.ii/ Let x 2 D: Then x is individually rational: u￿.0/ ￿ u.x/ because no singleton coalition
fig underblocks x using z D 0: And x is a satiation pro￿le: we have u￿.x/ ￿ u.x/ by de￿nition,
and so u￿.x/ D u.x/ because N does not underblock x using z D x:
Lemma B1. Let x be a satiation pro￿le and S a coalition.
.i/ If S underblocks x; then z exists such that u￿
S.z/ D uS.z/; and S underblocks x using z:
.ii/ If S weakly underblocks x and x is non-solo, then z exists such that u￿
S.z/ D uS.z/; and S
weakly underblocks x using z:
Proof. There is nothing to prove if N Y D 0; since then u￿ D u: So assume N Y > 0: Suppose S
underblocks or weakly underblocks x using O z: Let i 2 argmaxj2S Yj: If O Z ￿ Yi; then u￿
S.O z/ D
uS.O z/; and the result holds with z D O z: So assume O Z < Yi: De￿ne z by z￿i D O z￿i and zi D bi.O z/:
Because O Z < Yi; we see from (4) that zi D Yi ￿ O Z￿i > O zi, and Z D Yi ￿ Yj for all j 2 S:
Thus, u￿
S.z/ D uS.z/: Observe also that z￿S D 0; since z￿i D O z￿i and O z￿S D 0:
23By (PS￿/ and zi > O zi; we have u￿
j.z/ > u￿
j.O z/ for all j 6D i: Thus, since u￿
i .z/ D u￿
i .O z/ and
u￿
S.z/ D uS.z/; two implications hold:
u￿
S.O z/ > uS.x/ H) uS.z/ > uS.x/;
u￿
S.O z/ ￿ uS.x/ H) uS.z/ ￿ uS.x/:
The ￿rst (second) implication shows that if S underblocks (weakly underblocks) x using O z; then
it does so as well with z; so long as z ￿ x .z < x/; which we now show.
Suppose S underblocks x using O z: Then O z ￿ x; and we must prove z ￿ x: We already have
z￿i D O z￿i ￿ x￿i: From vi.Yi/ ￿ zi D ui.z/ ￿ ui.x/ and X ￿ Yi; we obtain
zi ￿ xi ￿ vi.Yi/ ￿ vi.X/ ￿ 0:
Now suppose x is non-solo and S weakly underblocks x using O z. Then O z < x; and we
must prove z < x: The previous paragraph still yields z ￿ x: Assume z D x: Then X D Yi:
If j 2 Snfig exists, then u j.z/ D u￿
j.z/ > u￿
j.O z/ ￿ u j.x/; contrary to z D x: Hence, S D fig:
From z D x; z￿i D 0￿i; and X D Yi; we obtain x D .Yi;0￿i/: This implies Yi D N Y; since X is
a satiation pro￿le. Hence, x is solo. This contradiction proves z < x: ￿









Proof. Suppose x is underblocked by a coalition S: Then by Lemma B1, z < x exists such that
z￿S D 0 and uS.x/ < uS.z/: Summing these inequalities over S and using ZS D Z yields
P
i2S
vi.X/ ￿ XS < fS.Z/: (11)
This and Z ￿ X yield Z < XS: As fS.Z/ ￿ V.S/; (11) also implies XS >
P
i2S vi.X/￿V.S/;
which is half of (10). Now, note that XS ￿ X and (11) imply fS.XS/ < fS.Z/: Thus, if
XS ￿ YS were true, the concavity of fS and Z < XS ￿ YS would imply an impossibility,
fS.XS/ > fS.YS/: This proves XS > YS; the other half of (10).









De￿ne z 2 Rn by z￿S D 0; and zi :D xi ￿ 1 ￿ vi.X/ C vi.YS/ for i 2 S: Then zi < xi for all
i 2 S: Summing zi over S yields Z D YS: Hence, O S :D fi 2 S : zi ￿ 0g 6D ?: De￿ne O z 2 Rn
C
24by O zi :D max.0;zi/: Then O z 2 Rn
C; O z￿O S D 0; and O z < x: Because O Z ￿ Z D YS; and O zi D zi for
i 2 O S; we have
vi. O Z/ ￿ O zi ￿ vi.YS/ ￿ zi D vi.X/ ￿ xi C 1 > vi.X/ ￿ xi:
for all i 2 O S: Hence, O S can use O z to underblock x: ￿
Proof of Proposition 1. By Lemma 5, D contains only satiation pro￿les. For a satiation pro￿le
x; Lemma B2 implies that x 2 D if and only if (10) does not hold for any S; i.e., if and only if
x satis￿es (8).
It is immediate that (7) implies (8), using XS ￿ X: Suppose x satis￿es (8). The ￿rst case to
consider is YS >
P





Hence, YS > X; and x satis￿es the ￿rst half of (7). The other case is YS ￿
P
i2S vi.X/￿ V.S/:
Then (8) implies XS ￿
P
i2S vi.X/ ￿ V.S/; and so x satis￿es the second half of (7). This
proves that (7) and (8) are equivalent. ￿
Proof of Corollary 1 .i/. If x D 0; we X < YN.x/ trivially, since N.x/ D ? and Y? :D 1: So
suppose x 6D 0; and let S D N.x/: Assume X > YS: Then, since X D XS; from (7) we obtain
fS.X/ ￿ V.S/ D fS.YS/: This is impossible, since YS is the unique maximizer of fS: ￿
Proof of Corollary 1 .ii/. Let x 2 C: Then .i/ implies X ￿ YN.x/ ￿ YN: Since x is ef￿cient
and X ￿ YN; a standard argument proves X D YN:
To prove the converse, consider any x 2 D with X D YN: Assume a coalition S blocks x
using a pro￿le O z: Then u￿
S.O z/ > uS.x/: Choose i 2 S so that Yi ￿ Yj for all j 2 S: Let z￿i D O z￿i
and zi D bi.O z/: Then u￿
S.z/ ￿ u￿
S.O z/ and u￿
S.z/ D uS.z/: Hence, uS.z/ > uS.x/: Summing these
inequalities over S and using ZS D Z and X D YN yields fS.Z/ >
P
i2S vi.YN/ ￿ XS: This
implies V.S/ >
P
i2S vi.YN/ ￿ XS: However, as x 2 D and X D YN ￿ YS; (7) requires
V.S/ ￿
P
i2S vi.YN/ ￿ XS: This contradiction proves x 2 C: ￿
Proof of Corollary 2. Because V.S/ > 0; YS > 0: This and jSj > 1 imply that for any i = 2 S;
substituting i for any j 2 S yields a coalition O S of the same size as S for which YO S > Yi: We
can thus assume YS > N Y:
Let O be the set of pro￿les x 2 Rn
CC satisfying
YS < X < YN; (12)
P
i2S
vi.X/ ￿ XS < V.S/; (13)
u￿.0/ ￿ u.x/: (14)
25The continuity of v implies O is open. By (14), all pro￿les in O are individually rational. By
(12), (13), and Proposition 1, O \ D D ?:
Both O and D (by Corollary 1) are subsets of
￿
x 2 Rn
C : X ￿ YN
￿
: It is straightforward to
show that u is a homeomorphism on this set. Thus, u.O/ is an open set and, since O \ D D ?;
u.O/\u.D/ D ?: Moreover, (14) implies u.O/ ￿ R: We have thus shown u.O/ to be an open
subset of Rnu.D/: It remains to show it is nonempty, i.e., to show O 6D ?:
De￿ne a pro￿le x by xi D v0
i.YS/YS for i 2 S; and xi D 0 otherwise. Because YS > 0;
P
i2S v0
i.YS/ D 1: Hence, X D XS D YS and
P
i2S vi.X/ ￿ XS D V.S/: Because YN > 0 and
S 6D N; YS < YN: Hence, for all suf￿ciently small " > 0; the pro￿le x" de￿ned by x"
i :D xi C"
satis￿es (12). Furthermore, since YS uniquely maximizes fS; x" also satis￿es (13). Now, for
any i = 2 S; ui.x/ D vi.YS/ > vi.Yi/ ￿ Yi; since YS > N Y: For i 2 S, the strict concavity of vi
and YS 6D Yi yield
ui.x/ D vi.YS/ ￿ v0
i.YS/YS
> vi.Yi/ C .YS ￿ Yi/v0
i.YS/ ￿ v0
i.YS/YS
D vi.Yi/ ￿ Yi:
Thus, x satis￿es (14), and so x" does too if " is small. Hence, " > 0 exists such that x" 2 O: ￿
Proof of Lemma 6. .i/ If ui.x/ ￿ u￿
i .0/; then coalition fig would weakly underblock x using
z D 0 < x: .ii/ If any S were to underblock x using some z ￿ x; then u￿
S.z/ > uS.x/ D u￿
S.x/
would imply z < x; and so S would weakly underblock x using z:
Proof of Lemma 7. If Y D N Y D 0; then x D 0; and hence x is neither weakly underblocked
nor, since N Y D 0; underblocked. So we can assume Y > 0: Hence, each xi D v0
i.YN/Y > 0;
and so x is non-solo. Since
P
i2N v0
i.YN/ D 1; X D Y: Thus, X ￿ N Y: Now, suppose coalition S
weakly underblocks x: Then, since x is a non-solo satiation pro￿le, Lemma B1 .ii/ implies the






vi.Z/ ￿ Z C XS: (15)






























vi.Z/ ￿ Z C XS;
26using XS D X
P
i2S v0
i.YN/ to obtain the equality and
P
i2S v0
i.YN/ ￿ 1 to obtain the ￿nal
inequality. This contradiction of (15) proves x is not weakly underblocked. ￿
Appendix C. Proofs Missing from Section 5
Proof of Proposition 2. As shown in the text, .i/ implies .ii/: To prove .i/; let x be a strictly in-
dividually rational pro￿le achieved by an equilibrium path E x: Assume x is weakly underblocked
by some coalition S using a pro￿le z: Then z < x; z￿S D 0; and u￿
S.z/ ￿ uS.x/:
Suppose S is a singleton, S D fig: Then z D .zi;0￿i/; and hence u￿
i .0/ ￿ u￿
i .z/ by (PD￿/:
But this implies u￿
i .0/ ￿ ui.x/; contrary to the strict individual rationality of x: This proves S
is not a singleton.
We next prove zS ￿ xS: Assume zi D xi for some i 2 S: This implies z￿i < x￿i: We
thus have u￿
i .z/ D u￿
i .xi;z￿i/ < u￿
i .x/; by (PS￿/: But this implies u￿
i .z/ < ui.x/; since x is a
satiation pro￿le by Lemma 2. This contradiction proves zS ￿ xS:
Let ￿ :D minft ￿ 1 : zS ￿ xt
Sg: Choose i 2 S so that x
￿￿1
i ￿ zi < x￿
i : Hence, i 2 N￿:
Moreover, since S isnotasingleton, k 2 Snfigexistssuchthat zk < x￿
k:Wethushave z￿i < x￿
￿i,
by the de￿nition of ￿ and the fact that z j D 0 ￿ x￿










￿i/ > ui.x/: Condition (6) thus fails to hold,
and so E x is not an equilibrium path by Lemma 1. This contradiction proves x is not weakly
underblocked. This and the fact that x is a satiation pro￿le imply x 2 D; by Lemma 6. ￿













Proof. Suppose x is achieved by an equilibrium path E x: Let O Y :D maxi2N.x/ Yi: Since X > O Y;










D .1 ￿ ￿/￿1 ￿
Ut






where Q Xt :D Xt ￿ xt
i C x
t￿1
i : For s ￿ t; because vi is concave and Xt￿1 ￿ Q Xt ￿ Xs; we have
v0
i.Xt￿1/.Xs ￿ Q Xt/ ￿ v0












































i/ D Xs ￿ Xt and letting ￿t :D
P
i2N.x/ v0




































i / ￿ 0:
Using the identity .1 ￿ ￿/
P
s￿t ￿s￿t.Xs ￿ Xt/ D ￿
P

















i / ￿ 0: (18)
Since X > O Y; we have v0




i.X/ < ￿ < 1:
Let T 0 ￿ T be a date such that ￿ > v0
i.Xt￿1/ for any t > T 0 and i 2 N.x/: Hence, considering
(18) for t ￿ T 0; we can replace each v0







C .￿ ￿ 1/.Xt ￿ Xt￿1/ ￿ 0: (19)
Because X > O Y; Lemma 2 implies E x converges to x asymptotically.8 Thus, Xt￿1 < X: Propo-
sition 2 implies x 2 D; and so X ￿ YN.x/ by Corollary 1 .i/. Hence, Xt￿1 < YN.x/: This and
















The left side of this inequality is a convex combination of the terms XsC1 ￿ Xs, and hence not
more than the largest of them. We thus obtain
max
s￿t





















8Lemma 2 only states that convergence is asymptotic if X > N Y: But its proof actually shows that convergence is
asymptotic under the weaker condition that X > maxi2N.x/ Yi.
28Note that Qt is nondecreasing in t: Hence, if Qt ￿ 1; then Qs ￿ 1 for all s ￿ t: But then a
recursive application of (20) would yield the contradiction Xt ! 1: Hence, Qt < 1 for all











t!1 Qt ￿ 1:
From this, (16) is obtained by taking ￿ ! maxi2N.x/ v0
i.X/: ￿
Proof of Proposition 3. Let x be achievable. Lemma 2, Proposition 2, and Corollary 1 .i/
imply N Y ￿ X ￿ YN.x/: If N.x/ D ?; then X D 0 D N Y; and x D 0 is a solo pro￿le. If
N.x/ D fig; then u￿
i .0/ ￿ ui.x/ D ui.xi;0￿i/ implies x D .Yi;0￿i/; and so Yi D N Y: Thus, in
this case x is again a solo pro￿le. Now suppose jN.x/j > 1: Then X > 0; and so YN.x/ > 0:
This, since each v0
i > 0; implies YN.x/ > maxi2N.x/ Yi D: O Y: We know X ￿ N Y ￿ O Y: If X D O Y;




i.X/ > 1; and so the concavity of each vi implies X < YN.x/: ￿
Appendix D. Proofs Missing from Section 6
Proof of Lemma 8. De￿ne E z by letting the players move as in E x; but only at dates that are
multiples of m: That is, let zt D 0 for t D 0;:::;m ￿ 1; and for t ￿ m let zt D xnkCi; where k
and i are the unique integers satisfying k ￿ 0; i 2 N; and
.nk C i/m ￿ t < .nk C i C 1/m:
In E z player i moves only at dates .nk Ci/m; since in E x she moves only at dates nk Ci: The path
E z is feasible for E N by (CY), since i 2 N.nkCi/m:
Let ￿ 2 .0;1/; and suppose E x is an equilibrium path of 0.￿; E N R/: Let O ￿ D ￿1=m: Since (PD)
holds, Lemma 1 implies E z is an equilibrium path of 0.O ￿; E N/ if it and O ￿ satisfy (6). So, letting










(Recall that now u￿ D u/: If zs
i D z
t￿1
i for all s ￿ t; then (PS) implies (21). So suppose a





i : This date is a multiple of m; say ￿ D pm:
Furthermore, z￿ D x p and z￿￿1 D zt￿1 D x p￿1: Observe that













￿i/ C O ￿
￿￿t











￿i/ C O ￿
￿￿t












￿i/ for each s D t;:::;￿ ￿ 1: (The overall inequality holds
trivially if ￿ D t:/ Hence, (21) holds if









which we now show. The de￿nitions of E z and O ￿ imply


























































￿i/; imply (22). ￿
Lemma D1. Given (PD), suppose a pro￿le x is not weakly underblocked. Then, a neighborhood
of x exists such that every O x in it that satis￿es O x < x is also not weakly underblocked.
Proof. As the lemma is trivially true for x D 0; we may suppose x > 0: Since x is not
weakly underblocked and (PD) implies it is a satiation pro￿le, we have x 2 D by Lemma 6
.ii/. Hence, X ￿ YN.x/ by Corollary 1. Assume the lemma is false. Then an in￿nite sequence
fxkg exists such that xk ! x; xk < x; and each xk is weakly underblocked, say by a coalition
Sk using a pro￿le zk < xk: By taking a subsequence we may assume Sk D S for all k (as the
number of coalitions is ￿nite), and fzkg converges to a pro￿le z (as each zk is in the compact
set [0;x]n/: Taking k ! 1 in the inequalities zk < x and uS.zk/ ￿ uS.xk/ yields z ￿ x and
uS.z/ ￿ uS.x/: Since zk
￿S D 0 for all k; z￿S D 0: Therefore S would weakly underblock x
using z if z < x: As this is not possible, z D x: This implies N.x/ ￿ S: Choose k so large that
for all i 2 N.x/; xk
i > 0: Hence, since N.x/ ￿ S; we have Xk
S D Xk: Because (PD) holds and
S uses zk to weakly underblock xk; uS.zk/ ￿ uS.xk/: Summing these inequalities over S yields
fS.Zk/ ￿ fS.Xk/: This, the strict concavity of fS; and
Xk < X ￿ YN.x/ ￿ YS;
30together imply Zk ￿ Xk: This contradicts zk < xk: ￿
Proof of Proposition 4. By Lemma 8, it suf￿ces to prove the result for E N D E N R: Given (PD),
the passive strategy pro￿le is an equilibrium, and so the origin is achievable. So suppose x > 0:
De￿ne d 2 Rn







for i 2 N.x/:
Since X < YN.x/ implies
P
j2N.x/ v0
j.X/ > 1; we have 0 < di < v0
i.X/ for i 2 N.x/: Choose
N ￿ > 0 small enough that N x :D x ￿ N ￿d ￿ 0: Since x is not weakly underblocked, Lemma D1
implies the existence of O ￿ 2 .0; N ￿/ such that O x :D x ￿ O ￿d is not weakly underblocked. Note that
0 ￿ N x < O x < x: We also have u.N x/ ￿ u.O x/ ￿ u.x/; since the concavity of each vi implies
that for any ￿ ￿ 0; @u.x ￿ ￿d/=@￿ D d ￿ v0.X ￿ ￿/ ￿ d ￿ v0.X/ ￿ 0:
De￿ne fxtg1




￿i : The rest of the proof consists of three steps.
Step 1. There exists a nondecreasing round-robin sequence fxtg1
tD0; and a discount factor ￿0 <








Proof of Step 1. Since di < v0
i.X/ for all i 2 N.x/; and di D 0 for i = 2 N.x/; we can ￿nd




< a < 1 (24)
for all i 2 N: De￿ne fxtg1














tD0 is a round-robin sequence that starts at N x and converges to x: Fix t > 0; and let
i D t .modn/: Let q ￿ 0 be the integer for which t D i C qn: At the end of period t ￿ 1;
players j D 1;:::;i ￿ 1 have raised their actions q C 1 times, and players j D i;:::;n have







x j ￿ N ￿aqC1dj for 1 ￿ j < i
x j ￿ N ￿aqdj for i ￿ j ￿ n:
(26)
31This implies


















x j ￿ N ￿aqCkdj for 1 ￿ j ￿ i
x j ￿ N ￿aqCk￿1dj for i < j ￿ n;
(28)
and



































Each Ak is a sum over n consecutive dates, and player i moves only at the ￿rst one, t C.k￿1/n.
Hence, for each of these dates s; xs
i D x
tC.k￿1/n









































where the inequality follows from Xs ￿ XtC.k￿1/n for s ￿ tC.k￿1/n: Using now the concavity



















This expression can be bounded from below. From (27) and (29) we have































32From this, 1 ￿ ak > a.1 ￿ ak￿1/; and 1 ￿ ak￿1 > a.1 ￿ ak￿1/, we obtain














D N ￿aqC1.1 ￿ ak￿1/:




i D N ￿aq ￿
1 ￿ ak￿
di: Consequently,












This and (24) imply










































.1 C " ￿ a/
￿
:
Thus, A ￿ 0 for ￿ ￿ ￿0 :D .1 C "/￿1=n: As ￿0 does not depend on t; Step 1 is proved. ￿
Step 2. There exists a ￿nite, nonincreasing round-robin sequence fxkgK
kD0 such that x0 D N x;
xK D 0; and u.xk/ ￿ u.O x/ for each k D 0;:::; K:
Proof of Step 2. Let x0 :D N x: To de￿ne x1; let x1
￿1 D x0
￿1: Let x1
1 D 0 if u1.0;x0
￿1/ ￿ u1.O x/:
Otherwise, let x1
1 be the Q x1 for which u1.Q x1;x0
￿1/ D u1.O x/I this equation has a unique solution,
and it is in the interval .0;x0
1/; since u1.￿;x0
￿1/ is monotonic and u1.x0/ < u1.O x/ < u1.0;x0
￿1/:
Note that 0 ￿ x1 ￿ x0; u1.x1/ ￿ u1.O x/; and by (PS), u j.x1/ < u j.O x/ for j 6D i:
Now suppose that for some k ￿ 1; pro￿les x0;:::;xk have been de￿ned, and they satisfy







￿1/ ￿ ui.O x/: Otherwise, let x
kC1





for which ui.Q xi;xk
￿i/ D
ui.O x/: By (PS), we have u.xkC1/ ￿ u.O x/:
This de￿nes a nonincreasing and bounded round-robin sequence fxkg1
kD0: Let z be its limit.
We have z ￿ xk for all k > 0; and u.z/ ￿ u.O x/:
Assume z > 0; so that N.z/ is a coalition (nonempty). In addition, assume ui.z/ < ui.O x/
for some i 2 N.z/: By continuity, Q xi 2 .0;zi/ exists such that ui.Q xi;z￿i/ < ui.O x/: Since
33xk ! z; there exists k0 such that ui.Q xi;xk
￿i/ < ui.O x/ for all k > k0: But then, the construction
of the sequence implies that for any k > k0 such that i D k C 1 .modn/; x
kC1
i < Q xi < zi:
This contradicts zi ￿ x
kC1
i : Thus, ui.z/ D ui.O x/ for all i 2 N.z/: Since z < O x; this shows that
N.z/ weakly underblocks O x: Since this contradicts the fact that O x is not weakly underblocked,
we conclude that z D 0:
We have u.0/ ￿ u.O x/ by Lemma 6 .i/; as u￿ D u and O x > 0 is not weakly underblocked.
Thus, K0 exists such that ui.0;xk
￿i/ < u.O x/ for all k ￿ K0 and i 2 N: The construction of the
sequence thus implies the existence of K ￿ K0 C n such that xK D 0: ￿
Step 3. There exists ￿ < 1 and a path E x converging to x such that E x is an equilibrium path of
0.￿; E N R/ for ￿ > ￿:
Proof of Step 3. Reverse the round-robin sequence obtained in Step 2, and add enough copies
of 0 to its beginning and N x to its end to obtain a ￿nite, nondecreasing round-robin path. This
yields a path, fztgT
tD0, from z0 D 0 to zT D N x; that has player 1 moving ￿rst and player n moving
last .z
T￿1
￿n D N x￿n/: To the end of of this path add the round-robin sequence obtained in Step 1:
zTCs D xs for all integers s ￿ 0: This yields a path E z D fztg1
tD0 that is feasible for E N R and
converges to x: To be notationally consistent, relabel the path as E x :D E z:
Let t ￿ 1 and i 2 N R




￿i/ ￿ Ui.E x;￿/: (30)
If t ￿ T; then since xt
￿i D x
t￿1




￿i/ D ui.xt￿1/ ￿ ui.O x/ < ui.x/:
Therefore, sinceUi.E x;￿/ ! ui.x/ as ￿ ! 1; there exists ￿t < 1 such that (30) holds for ￿ > ￿t:
We conclude that (30) holds for all t ￿ 1; i 2 N R
t ; and ￿ > ￿ :D max.￿0;￿1;:::;￿T/. Thus, by
(PD) and Lemma 1, E x is an equilibrium path of 0.￿; E N R/ for all ￿ 2 .￿;1/: ￿
Appendix E. Proofs Missing from Section 7
Theorem 1 is immediate from Propositions 2 ￿ 4 and the following result.
Lemma E1. c‘D0 D D:
Proof. Since D contains both the solo pro￿les and the satiation pro￿les that are not weakly
underblocked, D0 ￿ D: It remains to show that any point in D is a limit point of D0: So, let
34x￿ 2 D: Then X￿ 2 [ N Y;YN]: Choose Y 2
￿ N Y;YN
￿
in the following way:
(a) For X￿ D YN; choose Y < X￿ so that for all coalitions S 6D N; Y > YS:
(b) For X￿ < YN; choose Y > X￿ so that for all coalitions S; if Y > YS then X￿ ￿ YS:
De￿ne O x by O xi :D v0
i.YN/Y: Then O x 2 D; by Lemma 7. Note that O x ￿ 0 and O X D Y: Fix
￿ 2 .0;1/; and de￿ne x :D .1￿￿/O x C￿x￿: We shall show x is not weakly underblocked. This
will imply, since x ￿ 0 and X 2 . N Y;YN/; that x 2 D0: This completes the proof, as ￿ can be
arbitrarily close to 1:
So assume x is weakly underblocked, say by a coalition S using a pro￿le z: Then z < x;
z￿S D 0; and u￿
S.z/ ￿ uS.x/: Since x is a non-solo satiation pro￿le, Lemma B1 allows us to
assume u￿
S.z/ D uS.z/: Hence, uS.x/ ￿ uS.z/: Summing these inequalities over S yields
P
i2S
vi.X/ ￿ XS ￿ fS.Z/: (31)
Thus, since YS maximizes fS and fS.YS/ D V.S/;
P
i2S
vi.X/ ￿ XS ￿ V.S/: (32)
Since XS ￿ X; (31) also implies fS.X/ ￿ fS.Z/: Hence, since X > Z and fS is strictly
concave,
X > YS: (33)
This implies S 6D N; since X < YN: The remainder of the proof depends on how Y was chosen.
Case (a). In this case X￿ D YN > X; and so (33) yields X￿ > YS: Furthermore, since S 6D N;
the way Y D O X was chosen in this case implies O X > YS: Hence, because O x 2 D and x￿ 2 D;
the ￿rst part of Proposition 1 implies
P
i2S




S ￿ V.S/: (34)
Now, since each vi is strictly concave, ￿ 2 .0;1/; and O X 6D X￿; we have
P
i2S









.1 ￿ ￿/ O XS C ￿X￿
S
i














This and (34) imply
P
i2S vi .X/￿ XS > V.S/; contrary to (32). Hence, x must not be weakly
underblocked.
Case (b). In this case O X D Y > X￿; and so O X > X. Now (33) implies O X > YS: This and the
way Y D O X was chosen in this case imply X￿ ￿ YS: The fact that O X > YS and O x 2 D again
35imply the ￿rst inequality in (34). The second inequality in (34) holds for the same reason if







vi.YS/ ￿ YS C X￿ ￿ X￿
S
D V.S/ C X￿ ￿ X￿
S ￿ V.S/:
So (34) again holds, and the remaining proof is the same as in case (a). ￿
Proof of Theorem 2 .i/: Let O u 2 P \ W. E N/: Let fukg be a sequence in W. E N/ that converges
to O u: Then for each k; ￿k < 1 and an equilibrium path E xk of 0.￿k; E N/ exist such that uk D
U.E xk;￿k/: By Lemma 2, each E xk converges. Denote its limit as xk: Lemma 3 implies uk ￿
u.xk/: Proposition 2 implies xk 2 D: Proposition 1 (or Lemma E1) implies D is closed, and
Corollary 1 implies it is bounded. So fxkg has a subsequence that converges to some O x 2 D:
Taking limits on both sides of uk ￿ u.xk/ along the subsequence yields O u ￿ u.O x/: This implies
O u D u.O x/; since O u 2 P: Hence, O u 2 P \ D: From (9) we have P \ D D u.C/: Therefore,
P \ W. E N/ ￿ u.C/: ￿
Proof of Theorem 2 .ii/: By Lemma 9 (proved below), u.D/ ￿ W. E N/. Hence, since u.C/ D
P \ u.D/; we have u.C/ ￿ P \ W. E N/: Equality follows from part .i/: ￿
Proof of Lemma 9. Let x 2 D0. By Proposition 4, ￿ < 1 and a feasible path E x exist such
that E x converges to x; and E x is an equilibrium path for all ￿ > ￿: Hence, U.E x;￿/ 2 W. E N/
for all ￿ > ￿: Taking ￿ ! 1 yields u.x/ 2 W. E N/; since U.E x;￿/ ! u.x/: This proves
u.D0/ ￿ W. E N/: Hence, u.D/ ￿ W. E N/; since u is continuous, c‘D0 D D (Lemma E1), and
W. E N/ is closed. ￿
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